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The author examines a means by which cognitive psychological notions of innateness might ad-
dress the question ofhow the concept ofGod might be said to he "natural" or "instinctive." He draws
a distinction hetM'een innate cognitive nuchanisms and innate cognitive content, and examines the
concept of innateness from the perspectives of two major cognitive psychological theories of mind:
computationalism and connectionism. He argues that, from the cognitive psychological perspective,
concept{s) ofGod (or gods) cannot be said to be strictly innate, but that the development of the God-
concept does appear to be constrained by innate psychological structures and processes. He con-
cludes by suggesting that the psychological origin of the God-concept may be best described as a sort
of "primal behavior"—the inevitable product of interaction between innately determined psychologi-
cal mechanisms and aspects of the enviromnent that are common to all members of a population.
Introduction
How one can possibly have knowledge of
God is an ancient question that has received
substantial attention from a number of differ-
ent disciplines. Theologians and philosophers
from Augustine to Brunner have sought to
explain aspects of such knowledge by appeal-
ing to the idea that God instills the semen
religionis ("seed of religion"') in each and ev-
ery human being. From a different perspec-
tive, social scientists generally acknowledge
that religion is a pan-cultural fact of human
life, common to all historical and contempo-
rary societies,' and many—such as Jung,
Eliade, Levy-Bruhl, and Pascal Boyer—also
accord it, essentially, a "natural" or "instinc-
tive" origin. However, although theories in
this mould are exceedingly widespread, their
veracity remains questionable and their veri-
fication has proved to be very difficult indeed.
It is now widely acknowledged that the
huge variety of historical and contemporary
fonns of its expression confuse the criteria by
which something might be categorized as "re-
ligious," and attempting to define religion
merely in terms of substantive commonali-
ties has become an outmoded pursuit.- As
Robert Hinde notes:
...most, perhaps all, religion involves
belief in some form of transcendence or
in beings or cnlities which arc outside
normal experience.^
But the growing consensus, as McGrath ar-
gues, is that
No unambiguously common features
can be identified among the religions,
in matters of faith or practice*
However, religious belief continues to pervade
human society and, despite daunting theoreti-
cal and methodological problems, the search
for a universally applicable explanation of
religion continues.
As well as conceptual and definitional
problems, the study of religion is made more
difficult by the present explanatory inad-
equacy of the social sciences. Most social sci-
entists implicitly accept that a precise and
complete account of the causal interrelation-
ships between the "cultural" concepts of a re-
ligious system, the social world, and the minds
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and brains of individual human beings remain
beyond tlieir current reach. Acknowledge-
ment of these difficulties leads to the conclu-
sion that formulating a grand explanatory
theory of religion may be an impossible task,
and the recognition that putative explanations
of religious phenomena must have more mod-
est pretensions. It is with a good deal of cau-
tion, then, that I examine the issue of
humankind's "intuitive" religiosity, and the
scope as well as the central claims of this es-
say are, necessarily, very limited. Below, I
look at only one possible means of assessing
the degree of literal truth behind the notion of
an intuitive sensus cliviiiitatis ("sense of di-
vinity"): I consider the possibility that the
propensity to conceive of God"^ or gods is,
somehow, psychologically innate.''
Recently, there has been a good deal of
furor over cognitive anthropological theories
of the "naturalness" of religious systems, and
the role played by "innate" knowledge in the
intuitive appeal and well-documented resil-
ience of religious concepts, especially con-
cepts of God. This has coincided with a brief
resurgence of interest in the notion of innate-
ness per se, in the fields of neuropsychology,
cognitive psychology and artificial intelli-
gence,^ and the recent publication of a num-
Defining innateness merely in terms of
genetic inheritance, with no regardfor
the complex, interactive developmental
processes that are not directly genetically
encoded, and which govern the relation-
ship between genotype and phenotype,
will be almost vacuous.
ber of books attempting to ground some reli-
gious concepts in evolutionary psychology.**
Even though there is broad agreement over
the idea that innate mechanisms and processes
play a significant role in cognitive develop-
ment, "innateness" has become an extremely
diffuse concept that many have suggested
should be abandoned in the light of modern
developmental theories.'' When such ill-de-
fined concepts are applied to a subject as
definitionally challenged as the study of reli-
gion, confusion is inevitable and, in this case,
a significant degree of this confusion may be
attributed to two interrelated issues. First, as
regards cognition, what is meant by "innate-
ness" differs, depending on the model of cog-
nhive architecture one endorses. Secondly,
different cognitive anthropological theories
seeking to ground religious concepts firmly
in cognitive psychological models subscribe
to different theories of cognitive architecture,
and have tended to use the term "innate" with-
out adequately specifying what is meant by it.
So, my aim in this essay is primarily to
delineate two distinct notions of innateness
and to explore how they might be used to ex-
plicate the origin and development of the con-
cept of God or gods. In the first section, it
will be argued that cognitive development
should be understood in epigenetic terms as
an interactive process and an appropriate defi-
nition of innateness will be proposed. In the
second section the primary similarities and
differences between computationalist and
connectionist models of cognitive architecture
are brietly outlined and their relevance to the
task in* hand is estab-
lished. In the third sec-
tion, the connectionist
notion that cognitive de-
velopment is constrained
merely by innately deter-
mined mechanisms is
expounded and subse-
quently discussed in re-
lation to the formation of
;
the God-concept. The
fourth section examines
the plausibility of repre-
sentational nativist claims (most often asso-
ciated with computationalism) that the con-
tent of some mental representations can be
innately specified. The strands of the argu-
ment are brought together in the fifth section
through a brief exposition of how the notion
of innateness has been employed by Pascal
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Boyer to elucidate the "natural" cognitive
basis of religious concepts. It will be con-
cluded that whether one argues the case from
a connectionist or a computationalist perspec-
tive, the God-concept can be considered to
be truly innate only in trivial, almost vacuous
ways. Theories of representational nativism
and the mechanism approach to innateness
will, however, both be shown to lend credence
to the idea that aspects of its development may
indeed be innately constrained. The sixth and
final section will introduce the notion of "pri-
mal behaviors" to refer to those psychologi-
cal capacities, behaviors, etc., that are prod-
ucts of an interaction between an individual
and an element of the environment that is com-
mon to all members of the species. Primal
behaviors are assumed to be inevitable con-
sequences of development in a given environ-
ment and may represent the most fruitful way
of thinking about the origin of the God-con-
cept.
Nature, nurture and development
It has long be^en common practice to ex-
plain patterns of psychological change
throughout the course of development as the
consequences of "epigenesis" '"—that is, the
interaction between genetically determined
predispositions and environmental influ-
ences." Until recently, Johnson argues, epi-
genesis was considered to be a one-way causal
process acting in the direction from brain de-
velopment to cognitive change, but accep-
tance of an alternative theory, "probabilistic
epigenesis," is now beginning to be the norm.
According to this view, the relationship al-
leged to exist between the brain and cogni-
tion concerns two-way interactions, allowing
specific areas of the brain to become more
(or less) specialized, as a result of increasing
cognitive development. '-
Whatever one's precise genetic constitu-
tion, it is certain that psychological develop-
ment always depends to a certain extent on
the prior existence of an amenable develop-
mental environment. The practical insepara-
bility of nature and nurture means that defin-
ing innateness merely in terms of genetic in-
heritance, with no regard for the complex.
interactive developmental processes that are
ne)t directly genetically encoded, and which
govern the relationship between genotype and
phenotype, will be almost vacuous. As
Johnson notes, "if the term "innate" is taken
to refer to structure that is specified exclu-
sively by genetic information, it refers to noth-
ing that exists in the natural world except for
genes themselves." '''
On the strength of these arguments, Elman
et al. argue that, when used to refer to psycho-
logical phenomena, the tenn "innate" connotes
"putative aspects of brain structure, cognition
or behavior that are the product of interactions
internal to the organism." '^ This is a broad
yet appealing definition—since it remains ex-
clusive enough to discriminate between
intrapersonal and extrapersonal processes
—
and is employed throughout this essay.
Fodor is so convinced of the veracity of
the epigenetic developmental thesis that he
doubts anyone would really wish to argue
against it.'*^ Despite this, it has proved a no-
toriously difficult theory to unpack in any
meaningful way. Paraplirasing David Klalir,
Elman et al. assert:
[NJaturc and nurture are like the batman
and robin of developmental theory:
They hang around waiting in the wings,
swoop in and solve a problem, and then
disappear before ihey can be un-
masked."'
Culpability for this sorry state of affairs rests
mainly with the extreme theoretical and meth-
odological difficulties involved in mapping
the developmental pathways of complex and
multi-faceted psychological capacities.
Tliese difficulties loom especially large for
the study of the God-ct)ncept, given the enor-
mous range of factors, from the psychologi-
cal to the cultural, that may come to bear on
its development. It is accepted, in what fol-
lows, that "mature" God-concepts are largely
culturally determined, but whether there are
innate processes or concepts that contribute
to their development is still debatable. It is
hoped that this essay will clarify what can
justifiably be claimed regarding the extent of
biological and cultural influences on the for-
mation of concepts of God.
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Computationalism and connectionism
The majority of this essay concerns the
exposition of two major cognitive psychologi-
cal theories of innateness, and a discussion of
their respective implications for modeling the
origin and development of the God-concept.
It will be helpful to clarify briefly some par-
ticularly relevant features of the two models
of cognitive architecture—computationalism
and connectionism—in the terms of which the
theories of innateness will be discussed. This
is especially important since, as will become
clear in subsequent sections, both models use
similar terms, such as "representations" and
"schemata," to refer to slightly different con-
cepts.
Both computationalist and connectionist
theories ground the mind in the biological
substrate of the brain, both are essentially
"representationalist" and accord a central
place to the intentionality, or "aboutness," of
representations. They disagree, however, over
exactly how infomiation is represented. From
the perspective of connectionism, mental rep-
resentations are specific patterns of infomia-
tion instantiated in networks of neurons,
whereas from the computationalist perspec-
tive, mental representations are localized,
physically embodied symbols that merely
evoke something else.
What ultimately distinguishes advocates
of computationalism from the connectionists,
then, is the refusal of the former to make re-
course to the subsymbolic, neuropsychologi-
cal level to explain cognitive behavior. Cog-
nition, computationalists argue, is basically
the formal manipulation of symbolic repre-
sentations in the manner of a computer,
whereas connectionists argue that cognition
consists in the patterns of activity that occur
across networks of neurons that operate in par-
allel and are distributed throughout the brain.
The two theories of innateness that will
be discussed below will be referred to respec-
tively as the "mechanism approach" and "rep-
resentational nativism." The distinction be-
tween these approaches is not simply that
which exists between "process" and "con-
tent." Rather, the mechanism approach as-
serts that innateness is a feature only of the
cognitive mechanisms that constrain the de-
velopment of higher cognitive capacities,
whereas from the perspective of representa-
tional nativism, both developmentally con-
straining mechanisms and the content of spe-
cific representations may potentially be innate.
These two ways of conceiving of innate-
ness are certainly not mutually exclusive, and
both have proved extremely influential in cog-
nitive anthropological theories of the origins
of the concept of God. Neither representa-
tional nativism nor the mechanism approach
to cognitive innateness should be exclusively
identified with, respectively, computationalist
and connectionist models of cognitive archi-
tecture. By and large, however, although (as
will be seen below) connectionist models
theoretically permit representations to have
innately specified contents, theorists tend to
dismiss this possibility in practice. Indeed,
connectionist models of learning are often
employed to demonstrate the superfluity of
notions of innate representational content. I
shall, therefore, adopt the established policy
of discussing the mechanism approach in
terms of a connectionist model of cognitive
architecture, and representational nativism in
computationalist terms. My purpose in de-
scribing these approaches below in some de-
tail is twofold. First, I mean to emphasize the
underlying compatibility of connectionism
and computationalism as regards the notions
of cognitive innateness that have been adopted
by supporters of each. Secondly, I mean to
highlight the usefulness of the notion of in-
nate psychological processes in explaining
only the development of God-concepts and,
potentially, their universality.
It will be argued below that the mecha-
nism approach to innateness demonstrates
how the internal structure of the God-concept
could be innately determined, whereas repre-
sentational nativism provides a theory of how
the God-concept is ascribed certain charac-
teristics on the basis of innate ontological
knowledge. It will be argued, therefore, that
both approaches offer explanations of how the
developmental path of the God-concept may
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be innately constrained, but the origin of the
God-concept cannot be said to be strictly in-
nate—from the perspective of cognitive psy-
chology, no literal, heritable sensus divinitatis
can be discerned here. I will begin with a
fuller exposition of the mechanism approach
to innateness.
A connectionist perspective on
how development Is constrained
by innate mechanisms
Working from within a resolutely
connectionist paradigm, Elman et al., in Re-
thinking Innateness,^^ believe that the key to
an adequate account of "where knowledge
comes from" is to be found in developmental
cognitive neuropsychology. They identify the
question at the bottom of the innateness de-
bate as essentially the following:
...how to account for those iH'liaviors
which, given the normal experiences
encountered during development, are
universal across a species.'**
Although connectionist networks are usually
portrayed as simply reactive and as merely re-
sponding to statistical regularities in the envi-
ronment, Elman et al. believe that there is room
within connectionism for the idea that innate
constraints on higher
cognitive behaviors may
be implemented at the
sub-representational
level.'*' Thus, they sup-
pose, there is no need to
posit the existence of in-
nate representational
content, as has tradition-
ally been the norm in
theories of cognitive de-
velopment.
Elman et al. suggest
that since development is
a multi-leveled process—which occurs as a
result of interactions occurring within and/or
between a nuinber of different levels, from
the genetic, and intracellular levels all the way
through to the highest levels of biological and
mental organization—the notion of cognitive
innateness must also be considered at differ-
ent levels of analysis. The bottom line is that
if a particular concept, structure, process, etc.,
can be said to be innately detennined, then its
development must be constrained at one or
more of these levels. Innateness is assumed
to be a feature only of the mechanisms that
constrain cognitive development. They hy-
pothesize three possible levels at which con-
straints might act—the representational, the
sub-representational, and the chronotopic (de-
velopmental timing) levels. So, effectively,
the question that Elman et al. ask can be sum-
marized as follows: Is cognitive development
(in connectionist networks) constrained by ( 1
)
the existence of "hard-wired" representations,
(2) by the fact that the structure of the brain
encourages certain ways of organizing infor-
iTiation over others, or (3) by virtue of there
being a genetically detennined "schedule" of
maturation?
Representational constraints
As was mentioned above, Elman et al.
dismiss the likelihood of the existence of in-
nate representational content and, therefore,
the possibility of cognitive constraints acting
at the representational level. They base their
argument on the idea that, in a connectionist
network, the innate capacity to form specific
CognitioUy computationalists argiie^ is
basically the formal manipulation of
symbolic representations in the manner of
a computer, whereas connectionists argue
that cognition consists in the patterns of
activity that occur across networks of
neurons that operate in parallel and are
distributed throughout the brain.
types of representations can be modeled by
prespecifying weights between nodal connec-
tions. In neuronal terms the equivalent would
be the corresponding "weightings" of specific
cortical microcircuitry to encourage the pro-
duction of specific patterns of synaptic activ-
ity, but there is no evidence of this occurring
in the human brain. Rather, the cortex exhib-
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its remarkable plasticity into adulthood (con-
siderably more will be said about this below).
The apparent failure to find prespecified
patterns of cortical activity is not necessarily
adequate grounds for dismissing the possibil-
ity of innate representational contents, even
in connectionist models of mind, and Elman
et al. admit as much. Fodor notes:
Assuming (what's far from obvious...)
that connectionist networks can
represent cognitive content at all, they
can perfectly well represent innate
cognitive content inter alia.-"
In fact, there may well be other levels of neu-
ral organization, both higher and lower than
the conical level, which may support innate
representational content. This possibility re-
mains currently unexplored; so whereas
Elman et al. are forced to admit the possibil-
ity of innate representational content, they be-
lieve this to be a rare, perhaps even chimeri-
cal phenomenon.
Sub-representational constraints
Instead, Elman et al. prefer to locate in-
nate cognitive constraints at the sub-represen-
tational level. They propose that development
can be constrained at three different neural
levels: ( 1 ) the micro-level, due to the specific
properties of neurons, (2) the local level, due
to the structure of specific brain regions (for
example, the number of cortical layers, types
of neurons, etc.), and (3) the global or "macro-
level," due to connections between entire
brain regions. Elman et al. describe the gen-
eral idea as the proposition:
The overall structure of the network
constrains or determines the kinds of
information that can be received, and
hence the kinds of problems that can be
solved and the kinds of representations
that can subsequently be stored. In other
words, the macrocircuitry—meaning
principally the areal patterns of input/
output mappings—may be prespecified
even if the niicrocircutry is not.-'
So, to return to current concerns, what are
the implications for the origin of the God-con-
cept of there being cognitive developmental
constraints at the sub-representational level?
If innateness concerns only constraining
mechanisms then, obviously, the origin of the
God-concept cannot be considered to be in-
nate. If the connectionists are right, then the
representation of God is acquired through ex-
perience of the world; but are there any other,
perhaps more inundane, implications of innate
architectural constraints on the formation of
the God-concept? This question ultimately
concerns the innate structure that may be im-
posed upon representations and is best an-
swered in the terms of an increasingly popu-
lar cognitive framework-schema theory.
To date, theories that posit the existence
of inental "schemata" are the most researched
and well developed explanations of the orga-
nization of knowledge. Arbib and Hesse- re-
fer to schemata as the basic units of represen-
tation of a person's world, and other such vague
definitions are common, given the diffuseness
of the concept. Schemata are alleged to be
well-structured networks of infomiation, the
relationships between which are developed
through experience of the world. Schemata
may exist for everything from the concept of
a pencil, which incorporates the sub-concepts
of pencil-lead and wood and notions of sharp-
ness, to the process of booking a holiday, to
the concept of God. How the concepts of each
schema relate to one another depends on the
specific context in which they were experi-
enced and how they are subsequently em-
ployed. Eysenck and Keane-^^ point to the very
loose definition of schemata, given their ten-
dency to take on different structures, depend-
ing on the kind of knowledge they are repre-
senting, be it events, objects, relations, etc.
Generally speaking, then, they provide a
means of relating specific concepts to each
other through the organization of generic cat-
egories of knowledge. Connectionist sche-
mata differ from the traditional computa-
tionalist conception of schemata in .several
important ways. Crucially, representations are
no longer seen as the "values" in a network of
nodes, but rather as distributed patterns of in-
teraction among connected units, which are
themselves alleged to correspond (somehow)
to neurons or to clusters of neurons. Thus,
schemata are portrayed as the very processes
of mental organization themselves, rather than
the collection of information that makes up a
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specific concept. As such, they are knowl-
edge systems that are allegedly grounded
firmly in the neurological substrate, and that
mediate experience of the world. According
to the mechanism approach, these processes
are also innate.
This idea is useful in specifying how dif-
ferent aspects of the representation of God are
organized in a relational structure and embed-
ded in experience, but also in explaining how
the development of the God-concept must be
innately constrained. Developmental con-
straints must act so as to ensure that the ac-
quisition of novel information regarding the
God-concept is integrated with extant knowl-
edge in a way that is consistent with one's
ongoing experience of the world. The exist-
ence of such developmental constraints may
partially explain the observed similarities be-
tween the God-concepts of very young chil-
dren, such as those observed by Fowler and
Goldman.'^ After all, given a similar experi-
ence of reality and an innately constrained
way of structuring that experience, this is pre-
cisely what one would expect. Below, this idea
will be elaborated upon further through a dis-
cussion of Pascal Boyer's work in this field.
For now it will suffice to say that positing the
existence of innate representational mecha-
nisms does not necessarily support the idea
that the God-concept is innate, nor does it
throw any light on how a concept might come
to be a universal feature of human culture. It
may, however, support the idea that the gen-
eral developmental pattern of the God-con-
cept may be innately constrained.
Chronotopic constraints
Other possible innate constraints on the
development of higher cognitive behaviors
have been attributed to the specific timing
of "stages" in the developmental process.
These are referred to as "chronotopic con-
straints."-^ That such constraints may have
significant effects on development has fre-
quently been demonstrated in connectionist
networks, and in computational models of
mind. At the level of the brain it has been
demonstrated, for example, that specific re-
gions of cortex may become specialized for
a specific task purely on the basis that they
were "ready at the right time."-" Although, to
date, the developmental details remain sparse,
this effect has been implicated in the left-
hemisphere specialization for language. From
a computational perspective, Leslie has argued
that the mechanism for the emergence of the
child's capacity to employ a theory of mind
may be constrained by innate chronotopic fac-
tors. His argument is that the requisite "meta-
representational" capacity "matures" at
around 18 months. Such innate maturational
factors are almost certainly responsible for the
emergence of secondary sexual characteris-
tics in humans, so why should a similar pro-
cess not be implicated in psychological de-
velopment?
It seems likely that as certain mental ca-
pacities develop, so the mental representation
ofGod also changes. Goldman has suggested,
for example, on the strength of the Piagetian
developmental framework, that the God-con-
cept changes from anthropomorphic to ab-
stract over the course of development.-' Al-
though the cognitive-stage theories of reli-
gious development that were proposed by
Fowler and Goldman have been largely dis-
credited, there is still evidence to suggest that
the God-concept employed by children is sig-
nificantly different from that employed by
adults, perhaps as a by-product of the clarifi-
cation of the distinction between "fantastical"
and "realistic" thinking.-^ All things consid-
ered, it seems likely that that innate
chronotopic constraints are important deter-
minants of the development of the represen-
tational capacity in general and, so, of the
concept of God.
It appears that exploring the idea that in-
nate cognitive mechanisms may constrain the
development of the God-concept is both sen-
sible and informative in some manner, though
perhaps a trivial one. Even if one denies the
possibility of constraints at the representa-
tional level, innate developmental constraints
at the sub-representational level can inform
theories of how the component features of the
God-representation are organized within a
neurally instantiated framework. The coher-
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ence of the concept can also be accounted for;
and most useful of all, arguably, are the pos-
sibilities that exist for the elaboration of a
model in which features of the God-represen-
tation can be seen to be both interrelated and
related to other schematized information.
Unfortunately, even if one is to accept a
connectionist model of cognitive architec-
ture (and it is by no means certain that it is
accurate-^''), what the
mechanism approach
adds to a discussion of
the innateness of the
God-concept specifi-
cally is negligible. It
suggests that the devel-
opment of the God-con-
cept may be partially
innately prescribed as a
result of constraints on
its structure and the
mental organization of
related knowledge. This is certainly inter-
esting, but it supports the idea that it is wrong
to use the word "innateness"" in relation to
the God-concept, given that this term is in-
teipreted here as referring to what arises as
a result of interactions that are "internal to
the organism."" Indeed, the mechanism ap-
proach depends upon an individual's expo-
sure to religion in order to account for the
acquisition of the concept of God. So, is
there any stronger way in which the concept
of God might be considered to be innate?
This would entail a form of representational
nativism, which is the subject of the next sec-
tion, in which I address the possibility that
the God-concept is partially constituted by
innate representational, as well as culturally
acquired, knowledge.
Representational nativism
Fodor, Hinde, Boyer, Barrett, Keil and
Leslie (to name but a few) all subscribe to a
computationalist model of mind and argue that
cognitive innateness subsists in the fomi of
the actual content of mental representations
that are assumed to subserve higher level cog-
nitive functions.^" According to this view,
children are bom with some content-specific
mental representations that are elaborated
upon as a result of experience or that are some-
how "triggered" during maturation. These rep-
resentations—which may even act as precur-
sors or forerunners of adult mental capaci-
ties—allegedly constrain sensory perception
and the acquisition and representation of theo-
retical knowledge subsequently perceived in
relation to them.
Boyer^s theory and others explicitly deny
the existence ofan innate ^^God-module"
and offer alternative explanationsfor the
construction of the God-concept that impli-
cate the same domains of knowledge and
the same mental processes that are in-
volved in theformation of other concepts.
Those who advocate a representational
nativism have produced a substantial corpus
of experimental literature, and instances of
potentially "innate knowledge'" are easy to
find. Before proceeding with an example of
how a theory of representational nativism
might elucidate the fomiation of the God-con-
cept, however, it is necessary to highlight a
few features of the classical (Fodorian) infor-
mation processing model that are especially
pertinent to the current discussion. It will be
argued that the mechanism approach is not
incompatible with representational nativism,
and that connectionist criticisms are not as
damning of it as some have presumed.
Supporters of information-processing
models allege that the brain exhibits a "modu-
lar" structure. That is to say, it is structured
in such a way that the work of information-
processing is divided between different areas
of the brain. Among the characteristic prop-
erties of modules are the requirements that:
( 1 ) they are encapsulated—the flow of infor-
mation within and between modules, and be-
tween unmodularized mental systems is con-
strained by cognitive architecture; (2) they
exhibit ontogenetic universals—modules de-
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velop according to a characteristic develop-
mental sequence; they are localized and do-
main specific—each module is concerned with
dedicated neural structures that perform op-
erations upon one and only one specific type
of information, for example, information rel-
evant to face recognition, or language learn-
ing; (3) they are innate
—
'"the information and
operations proprietary to a module are more
or less exhaustively 'genetically prepro-
grammed' (whatever, exactly, that means)." ^'
Modules are to be seen as distinct from rep-
resentations but as acting so as to process in-
formation concerning specific categories of
representations. In the Fodorian model, then,
both representational contents and cognitive
mechanisms can be innately detemiined.
So, what are the objections to the idea of
innate representational content? It is impor-
tant to realize, as Fodor does, and as even
Elman et al. acknowledge, that the existence
of developmental constraints at the cognitive
architectural level does not preclude the pos-
sibility of domain specificity, the existence
of innate representational content, nor the
possibility that developmental constraints op-
erate at that level. They are wholly compat-
ible. Furthermore, many who reject
connectionism as an adequate theory of cog-
nitive representation accept it as a viable
model at the implementational level, and
would be happy to accept that the innate neu-
ronal structure of the brain must somehow
affect its processing capacity. Nevertheless,
supporters of connectionist models of cogni-
tive architecture engage in two major lines
of argument against the plausibility of innate
representational content.
Firstly, they suggest that, since the prin-
ciples of modularity and domain-specificity
are foundational to representational
nativism, observations of cortical plasticity
make innate representational content an un-
likely prospect. After all, they argue, if ex-
periments can show that a specific area of
the cortex—the supposed seat of represen-
tational encoding—can host a variety of dif-
ferent types of representations, depending on
non-genetically encoded developmental fac-
tors, then it seems ridiculous to suppose that
a particular representation could be innately
"hard-wired" to be anywhere specific. How-
ever, it seems that studies investigating neu-
ral plasticity have been restricted to (quite
often unsuccessful) demonstrations of corti-
cal equipotentiality, mainly as regards the pri-
mary sensory cortices of non-human verte-
brates.'' Even if these results could be par-
tially generalized to humans—and it is by no
means certain that they can—there is little
reason to suppose that cortical regions gov-
erning higher cognitive capacities in humans
are anywhere nearly as plastic. "*' Fodor as-
serts:
|N|ohody knows what the neural
plasticity of the infant's brains means.
Nobody has any idea, for example,
whether the infant's brain is plastic in
respects that affect cognitive architec-
ture.'^
Secondly, opponents of representational
nativism argue that the apparent developmen-
tally constraining effects of innate represen-
tational content can actually be readily ex-
plained as the effects of innate representa-
tional mechanisms. To these ends, Elman et
al. choose some of the classic examples of
capacities that have been supposed to depend
upon innate representations—such as the
child's sensitivity to faces, speech and lan-
guage, the child's "intuitive" ontological as-
sumptions regarding the physical world, and
the capacity to infer object pemianence—and
attempt to redescribe experimental findings
from a connectionist perspective." These
capacities are ultimately described as "emer-
gent forms," in the sense that they (mysteri-
ously) naturally emerge from certain recur-
rent patterns of activity in neural networks.
They do meet with some limited success, but
then so have theories that have implicated in-
nate representational contents. Once again,
Fodor objects:
If representational innateness is often
the obvious theory of a creature's
mental capacity, why not suppose, at
least some of the time, that that's
because it's the right explanation of the
creature's mental capacity?-"'
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Even if there is some truth to representa-
tional nativism, what are the imphcations for
theorizing about the concept of God? Could
there perhaps be an innate precursor to the
God-concept that develops over time through
exposure to a specific culture? The follow-
ing section addresses this issue through an ex-
position of Boyer's theory of "the naturalness
of religious ideas," " and draws together the
strands of the argument so far. It will be ar-
gued that Boyer presents good grounds for
dismissing the idea that the God-concept is
innately determined in any meaningful way,
but further discussion of representational
nativism will add extra weight to the argu-
ment that innate psychological capacities con-
strain its structure and development.
The naturalness of the God-concept
Theories of innate representational con-
tent have enjoyed a high profile in cognitive
psychological models of the transmission and
acquisition of a variety of religious concepts,
including the God-concept.^** Both Pascal
Boyer and Stewart Guthrie explicitly offer ex-
planations of how some religious concepts
come to be universally evident. I shall con-
centrate on Boyer's contribution, which has
proved to be among the most intluential in all
the cognitive study of religion.
Boyer's starting point is the acknowledge-
ment of the widespread opinion that there is
no "cognitive domain" of religious symbol-
ism, and no cognitive discontinuity between
(so-called) religious cognition, reasoning
about religion, and reasoning about secular
life.''' He also observes that religious repre-
sentations are possessed of certain features
that are found to be recurrent in very diverse
cultures, and that at least some of the elements
of religious concepts—such as those concern-
ing the existence and agency of supernatural
beings, for example—do not appear to be cul-
turally transmitted. In the process of attempt-
ing to explain this cultural underdetermina-
tion, and the diachronic and synchronic resil-
ience of some concepts, Boyer has developed
the concepts of intuitive and counter-intuitive
ontologies.
By "intuitive ontologies" he means those
systems of beliefs that enable "the spontane-
ous assumptions humans entertain about on-
tological categories,"""' and that require no
cultural medium of transmission. It is these
intuitive ontologies that are alleged to have
innately specified content. By "counter-in-
tuitive ontologies" he means those systems
of belief that contain certain elements that
seem explicitly to contradict intuitive beliefs.
Boyer is certainly not alone in making such
assumptions and has apparently been sup-
ported by a good deal of empirical psycho-
logical research.^'
Keil's classic investigation"*' of the evo-
lution of ontological distinctions in young
children supported Sommers' hypothesis that
the restricted number of appropriate predicates
that a specific tenn relating to a specific con-
cept might take on implies that concepts can
often be placed, on the basis of very Uttle in-
formation, firmly within a certain ontologi-
cal category, such as sentient being, artifact,
event, vegetable, etc.^' An ontological distinc-
tion between such objects as "living species"
or "artifacts," and contingently between the
descriptive terms appropriate for each, was
made by the children purely on the basis of
their description as being "sleepy" or "fixed,"
even when the objects in question were purely
fictional and, therefore, completely novel.
Keil's experimental results have since been
supported by numerous other investigations,^
and such findings are often used to support
the notion of innate representational content.
As regards the cognitive anthropological
study of religious concepts, the three most
important areas of research concern the intri-
cacies of children's intuitive notions of
agency,^'^ and animism,^'' and their (arguably)
innate capacity to form and employ a rela-
tively complex "theory of mind.""*^ Barrett
and Keil argue that the relevance of these stud-
ies for the potential innateness of God-con-
cepts lies in their implications for an expla-
nation of how a limited range of properties
come to be ascribed to God.^**
What is proposed is that certain features
of innate representations, coupled with a do-
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main-specific information-processing capac-
ity and innate sub-representational develop-
mental constraints, restrict the types of God-
concepts that people are able to form. For
example, the perception of God as having
agency in the physical world encourages the
interpretation of divine actions against a back-
ground of intentionality, beliefs and desires.
Thus, God is conceptualized as a living-kind
first and foremost, and through the
schematization of this information, other in-
formation becomes associated with the con-
cept of God. If God is accredited with inten-
tional mental states, innate attributional pro-
cesses require that a variety of (nher mental
characteristics be also imparted. God could
possibly be ascribed intentional mental char-
acteristics, such as "perceiving" or "knowl-
edgeable," for example, as well as human af-
fective states such as "angry" or "loving." All
this may potentially be inferred as a direct con-
sequence of perceptions of God's agency.
Describing the formation or acquisition of the
God-concept as a primal behavior is likely to
be the most it is possible to say about the in-
nateness of its origins. From a neuropsycho-
logical developmental perspective^ no innate
representation that could be said to correspond
to the God-concept appears to exist.
Boyer endorses the widespread opinion
that there is no "cognitive domain" of religious
symbolism, and no cognitive discontinuity
between (so-called) religious cognition, rea-
soning about religion, and reasoning about
secular life. It differs from connectionist
schema theory by supposing that there is no
organizational level beneath the symbolic rep-
resentational level at which relationships be-
tween information can be modeled. In
computationalist schemata, then, specific con-
cepts or even sub-schemata take the forms of
values that fill "slots" in chains or networks of
infonnation. Relations between the slots can
take many forms, such as X hit Y, or X caused
Y; and assumptions characteristic of a specific
concept must be integrated to the extent that
each assumption helps to render other concep-
tual assumptions intelligible. Boyer refers to
conceptual assumptions that are "linked by
causal connections" as a "causal nexus"; and
he asserts that the causal relationships between
these assumptions contribute to the cohesive-
ness of a concept.^'' The characteristics as-
cribed to God on the basis of natural ontologi-
cal assumptions may constitute just such an
innate causal nexus, which can then be tleshed
out through an individual's experience of the
world and the formal learning of a religious
tradition.
There are contingent benefits of this theory,
such as an explanation of why God is unlikely
to be imputed with the characteristics of, for
example, a stone or running water—such enti-
ties are just not "naturally" perceived to have
agency in the world, and their representations
^^
are not schematically
connected to those
representations that
are characteristically
part of agent con-
cepts. It therefore ac-
counts for the limited
range of extant God-
concepts, despite
there being a poten-
tially infinite variety
of potential interpre-
tations of any given
experience, even among those who share an
immediate environment.
So, Boyer's computationalist theory of
the formation of God-concepts is able to
account for how they acquire some of their
distinctive characteristics. Once again, no
claims regarding an innately determined rep-
resentation of God are made. In fact, Boyer
makes exactly the opposite claim. The
causal nexus is not alleged to provide an
exhaustive account of conceptual structure,
since it fails to account for some of the pe-
ripheral information a person holds about
specific objects and the conceptual category
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to which they belong. The God-concept will
also come to incoiporate assuniptit)ns that
are not part of that causal nexus—such as
"God deplores violence," or "God is infi-
nite, omnipresent and omniscient." Boyer
argues that these assumptions are comprised
of auxiliary knowledge^" that is acquired
through purely cultural mediums—Christian
doctrine for example.^'
But what of the idea that there may be an
innate "precursor" to the God-concept, a
precoursor that is subsequently elaborated
upon? Theoretically, this remains a possibil-
ity, but there is no evidence at all that this is
the case. Actually, Boyer's theory and others
explicitly deny the existence of an innate
"God-module," and offer alternative explana-
tions for the construction of the God-concept
that implicate the same domains of knowledge
and the same mental processes that are in-
Both the mechanism approach and theo
ries of representational nativism shed
some light on how innate psychological
mechanisms may come to bear on the
development and structure of the God-
concept, but not on its origin.
volved in the formation of other concepts.
"
There is, therefore, no need to postulate the
existence of an innate precursor to the God-
concept to explain its cultural underdetermi-
nation. As with the mechanism approach, it
seems that the only innate features of the God-
concept that representational nativism can
explicate are those that are common to other
kinds of concept, namely innately detennined
constraints on aspects of development.
To summarize, then, both the mechanism
approach and theories of representational
nativism shed some light on how innate psy-
chological mechanisms may come to bear on
the development and structure of the God-
concept, but not on its origin. Interaction with
the environment seems essential for its initial
formation or acquisition. Consideration of the
representation ofGod at the subpersonal cog-
nitive psychological level leads to the con-
clusion that it can be considered to be innate
only in three very trivial, almost vacuous,
senses: firstly, as with all concepts, it is struc-
tured in a way determined by innate cogni-
tive architectural constraints; secondly, as with
all other concepts, the particular characteris-
tics it can assume are constrained by intuitive
ontological assumptions regarding basic cat-
egories of existence; and thirdly, as with many
other concepts, its development continues in
tandem with other concepts and capacities that
may mature according to an innately prede-
termined pattern.
This is not to say that these observations
are not interesting. To the contrary, I believe
that the contribution of cognitive psychology
to the study of religion is invaluable precisely
because of these observations—the idea that
the development of the
God-concept is con-
strained by universal
cognitive features has
provided a new impetus
y to the study of religion,
" and may eventually
prove to be of unri-
|g vailed importance for
I the psychology of reli-
m gion. I am merely ar-
guing that these observations do not add up to
"innateness," as it is traditionally conceived.
The developmental process may be innately
constrained, but this is very different to the
claim that the God-concept itself is innate.
However, if the development of the God-
concept can be considered to be an innately
constrained process, then perhaps the notion
of innateness still has a role to play in expli-
cating the origin of the God-concept. As a
final thought, I shall briefly consider the idea
that the God-concept is a product of innately
determined psychological processes and fun-
damental, universal features of an individual's
environment.
Primal behaviors and the God-concept
It is certainly not the case that because a
particular concept, capacity, behavior, etc.,
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appears to be universally evident in a particu-
lar population that it should automatically be
presumed to be innate. Indeed, Johnson and
Morton"^^ have drau'n an important distinc-
tion between those cognitive phenomena that
are products solely of intrapersonal interac-
tions, and those phenomena that, though uni-
versal, are products of interactions with as-
pects of the environment that are common to
all members of the species. This latter cat-
egory of cognitive phenomena is referred to
as "primal."
Describing the formation or acquisition of
the God-concept as a primal behavior is likely
to be the most it is possible to say about the
innateness of its origins. From a neuropsy-
chological developmental perspective, no in-
nate representation that could be said to cor-
respond to the God-concept appears to exist.
Quite to the contrary, cognitive anthropologi-
cal models such as Boyer's are primarily con-
cerned with demonstrating that the core
schematized content of the God-concept de-
pends upon and can be explained by the prior
experience of all everyday reality. Only
through experience of natural phenomena can
the God-concept acquire its distinctive char-
acteristics, though aspects of its structure and
development may depend upon innate cogni-
tive constraints.
There is a psychological tradition of view-
ing the origin of the God-concept in terms of
primal behavior that extends from psychoana-
lytic to cognitive anthropological theory. The
most famous expositor of this type of theory
in modern times is Ana-Maria Rizzuto who,
in her psychoanalytic t)bject-relations theory
of the Birth of the Living God, proposed that
the God-representation develops as an essen-
tial element in early cognitive development.
These theories do not consider the formation
and development of the God-concept to be
innate so much as inevitable—a product of
the human condition like so many other as-
pects of social and perceptual reality, but not
necessarily a purely intrapersonal psychologi-
cal creation.
A good example of such a theory in cog-
nitive psychological terms is that of Stewart
Guthrie, who argues that the human tendency
to anthropomorphize nature leads, ulti-
mately, to the inference that the world is
populated by invisible supernatural beings."^^
Guthrie argues that the antliiopomoiphic ten-
dency is rooted in evolutionary theory and
originally would have bestowed a selective
advantage on the bearer, as a result of their
concomitant hypervigilance. In the modern
world, he argues, this innate perceptual bias
may have led to the development of com-
plex religious systems, but the tendency to
anthropomoiphize reality persists. Though
he does not use the term himself, the origi-
nal formation of the God-concept and the
propensity to intuit the existence ofGod can
be understood in these accounts as a primal
behavior—the product of an interaction be-
tween an innate perceptual bias and a stimu-
lating environment that was common to all
members of the species. My aim here is not
to defend Guthrie's theory, merely to illus-
trate a potentially fruitful avenue of future
research into the universality of religious
concepts.
Concluding thoughts
Through an analysis of the cognitive psy-
chological definitions and theories of innate-
ness, the origin of the God-concept has been
shown to be. in some fomi, dependent on
environmental experience. Whether one en-
dorses a connectionist or a computational ist
model of cognitive architecture, or a repre-
sentational nativist or mechanism approach
to psychological innateness. there is no good
reason to suppose that the God-concept, or
a precursor to it, originates as a result solely
of internal interactions. Whereas aspects of
its structure and development may be said
to be innately constrained, it cannot be said
to be an innate representation in any non-
vacuous or interesting way. So, from the per-
spective of cognitive psychology at least, the
historically popular attempt to ground
knowledge of God in an intuitive or arche-
typal God-concept appears misguided. There
may well be a natural, heritable semen
religionis or sensus divinitatis—and future
possibilities for research lie in the contin-
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ued exploration of this possibility—but it is
unlikely that an innate concept of God ful-
fills either of these roles.
As regards an adequate psychological
theory of the universality of the God-con-
cept, cognitive psychology alone is unlikely
to provide it. The best hope for such a theory
lies in the research of so-called primal be-
haviors, and the attempt to make a fiim con-
nection between psychological dispositions,
innate or otherwise, and elements of the en-
vironment that are common to all members
of the human species. Boyer and others have
shown how cognitive psychology may offer
a new way partially to explain the recunence,
perhaps even the pan-cultural appeal of reli-
gious concepts, but innateness is too strong
a claim. It seems that the formation of God-
concepts may be an inevitable feature of hu-
man cognitive development, but further
cross-cultural empirical research in this area
is essential to validate this assertion prop-
erly. A fuller explanation presents method-
ological as well as theoretical challenges, but
the critical examination of old or misapplied
concepts, such as has been attempted in this
essay, and the willingness to integrate theo-
ries to create a genuinely interdisciplinary
approach can only drive the study of reli-
gion forward.
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1. See Burkert; Rappaport.
2. It is important to note that throughout
this essay the generic term "religion" is dis-
tinguished from the specific religions. When
a specific religion is the topic of discussion,
it is cleiuly denoted as such.
3. Hinde, Why Gods Persist, p. 1 1.
4. McGrath, p. 531.
5. Throughout this essay, the term "God-
concept" should not be presumed to refer to
the conception of God promoted by any spe-
cific religion. Rather, it is meant to refer to a
more general concept, such as Robert Hinde's
notion of "beings or entities which are out-
side normal experience."
6. It is accepted here that there are, and
there may always have been, atheists. This
does ni)t present a serious challenge to the
notion that the God-concept may be innately
determined, since it is possible that atheism
involves a rejection of an extant God-concept
rather than the failure to acquire one in the
first place. Indeed, some theorists such as Ana-
Maria Rizzuto have proposed that all people
—
atheists and believers alike—hold a represen-
tation of God throughout their lives, though
some may attend to it more than others.
7. See Elman et al.; and Johnson.
8. See Hinde, op. cit.; and Burkert.
9. For example, Hinde, Biological Bases of
Hunuin Social Behaviour.
10. Theories of development are now rarely
characterized by the hackneyed and simplis-
tic distinction between "nature" or "nurture."
Historically, these terms encouraged the as-
sumption that patterns of developmental
change must be entirely attributable to either
genetically predetermined factors, or to the
influence of the person's environment. Such
an extreme disjunction of the organism from
its developmental circumstances became in-
creasingly unpopular as understanding of the
distal effects of genes increased, and encour-
aged the perception that the relationship be-
tween phenotype and genotype is rarely as
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straightforward as Mendel's famous experi-
ments would have us believe.
1 1
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See Elman et al., ch. 1
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12. The classic formulation of a causal epi-
genetic approach to psychological develop-
ment was proposed by Piaget. Paradigmatic
examples of the probabilistic epigenetic model
at the neuropsychological level are provided
by studies of linguistic development. The ac-
quisition of language is frequently conceived
as a dynamic process that is dependent upon
numerous neurophysiologically grounded
psychological faculties, and thereby mediated
by intrapersonal biological processes, but
which is continually modified through the
assimilation of new experience.
13. Johnson, p. 8.
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from outside the organism." Elman et al., p.
22.
15. Fodor, //; Critical Condition, p. 146.
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17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
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cognitive architectural level but disagree with
connectionists over what the cognitive archi-
tectural level is. Hence, it is confusing to re-
fer, as Elman et al. do, to the "architectural
level" of constraint; and in this section, the
level at which connectionists suppose cogni-
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representational level" of constraint.
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ity in which the God-representation is purely
abstract may be aboriginal or precursor reli-
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the appropriate responses, especially those of
Boyer, Further Distinctions; and Chandler.
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the methodological, and argumentative inge-
nuity of Elman et al., the problem persists that
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instance where it's known what pattern of neu-
ral connectivity realizes a certain cognitive
content, innate or learned, in either the infant's
nervous system of the adult's. To be sure, our
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